Gibbard-Satterthwaite Games
Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Main Track. Pages 533-538.
Abstract
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem implies the ubiquity of manipulators — voters who could change the election outcome in their favor by unilaterally modifying their vote. In this paper, we ask what happens if a given profile admits several such voters. We model strategic interactions among Gibbard–Satterthwaite manipulators as a normal-form game. We classify the 2-by-2 games that can arise in this setting for two simple voting rules, namely Plurality and Borda, and study the complexity of determining whether a given manipulative vote weakly dominates truth-telling, as well as existence of Nash equilibria.
@inproceedings{ijcai2015p81,
title = {Gibbard-Satterthwaite Games},
author = {Elkind, Edith and Grandi, Umberto and Rossi, Francesca and Slinko, Arkadii M.},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-15}},
publisher = {International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence},
editor = {Qiang Yang and Michael Wooldridge},
pages = {533--538},
year = {2015},
month = {7},
note = {Main Track},
url = {https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/81},
}
TY - CPAPER TI - Gibbard-Satterthwaite Games AU - Elkind, Edith AU - Grandi, Umberto AU - Rossi, Francesca AU - Slinko, Arkadii M. T2 - Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-15 PB - International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence PY - 2015 SP - 533 EP - 538 UR - https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/81 ER -Copied
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