{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Gibbard-Satterthwaite Games","authors":[{"name":"Edith Elkind","slug":"edith-elkind","given":"Edith","family":"Elkind","affiliation":""},{"name":"Umberto Grandi","slug":"umberto-grandi","given":"Umberto","family":"Grandi","affiliation":""},{"name":"Francesca Rossi","slug":"francesca-rossi","given":"Francesca","family":"Rossi","affiliation":""},{"name":"Arkadii M. Slinko","slug":"arkadii-m-slinko","given":"Arkadii M.","family":"Slinko","affiliation":""}],"abstract":"The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem implies the ubiquity of manipulators — voters who could change the election outcome in their favor by unilaterally modifying their vote. In this paper, we ask what happens if a given profile admits several such voters. We model strategic interactions among Gibbard–Satterthwaite manipulators as a normal-form game. We classify the 2-by-2 games that can arise in this setting for two simple voting rules, namely Plurality and Borda, and study the complexity of determining whether a given manipulative vote weakly dominates truth-telling, as well as existence of Nash equilibria.","doi":null,"url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/81","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/0081.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/81.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/bibtex/81","volume":{"slug":"2015","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2015","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/","year":2015,"location":"Buenos Aires, Argentina","dates":"25–31 July 2015","editors":"Qiang Yang and Michael Wooldridge","isbn":"978-1-57735-738-4","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence","doi_prefix":""},"section":"Game Theory","track":"Main Track","number":81,"pages":{"first":533,"last":538},"keywords":[],"videos":[],"references":[],"license_note":"Copyright International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence."}