Equilibrium Refinement through Negotiation in Binary Voting

Grandi, Umberto; Grossi, Davide; Turrini, Paolo

Equilibrium Refinement through Negotiation in Binary Voting

Umberto Grandi, Davide Grossi, Paolo Turrini

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Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Main Track. Pages 540-545.

Abstract

We study voting games on binary issues, where voters might hold an objective over some issues at stake, while willing to strike deals on the remaining ones, and can influence one another's voting decision before the vote takes place. We analyse voters' rational behaviour in the resulting two-phase game, showing under what conditions undesirable equilibria can be removed as an effect of the pre-vote phase.

Umberto Grandi, Davide Grossi, and Paolo Turrini. 2015. Equilibrium Refinement through Negotiation in Binary Voting. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-15. IJCAI, 540–545. https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/82

@inproceedings{ijcai2015p82,
  title     = {Equilibrium Refinement through Negotiation in Binary Voting},
  author    = {Grandi, Umberto and Grossi, Davide and Turrini, Paolo},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on
               Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-15}},
  publisher = {International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence},
  editor    = {Qiang Yang and Michael Wooldridge},
  pages     = {540--545},
  year      = {2015},
  month     = {7},
  note      = {Main Track},
  url       = {https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/82},
}

TY  - CPAPER
TI  - Equilibrium Refinement through Negotiation in Binary Voting
AU  - Grandi, Umberto
AU  - Grossi, Davide
AU  - Turrini, Paolo
T2  - Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-15
PB  - International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence
PY  - 2015
SP  - 540
EP  - 545
UR  - https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/82
ER  -