A Dictatorship Theorem for Cake Cutting
Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Main Track. Pages 482-487.
Abstract
We consider discrete protocols for the classical Steinhaus cake cutting problem. Under mild technical conditions, we show that any deterministic strategy-proof protocol for two agents in the standard Robertson-Webb query model is dictatorial, that is, there is a fixed agent to which the protocol allocates the entire cake. For n > 2 agents, a similar impossibility holds, namely there always exists an agent that gets the empty piece (i.e. no cake). In contrast, we exhibit randomized protocols that are truthful in expectation and compute approximately fair allocations.
@inproceedings{ijcai2015p74,
title = {A Dictatorship Theorem for Cake Cutting},
author = {Brânzei, Simina and Miltersen, Peter Bro},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-15}},
publisher = {International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence},
editor = {Qiang Yang and Michael Wooldridge},
pages = {482--487},
year = {2015},
month = {7},
note = {Main Track},
url = {https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/74},
}
TY - CPAPER TI - A Dictatorship Theorem for Cake Cutting AU - Brânzei, Simina AU - Miltersen, Peter Bro T2 - Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-15 PB - International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence PY - 2015 SP - 482 EP - 487 UR - https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/74 ER -Copied
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