{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"A Dictatorship Theorem for Cake Cutting","authors":[{"name":"Simina Brânzei","slug":"simina-branzei","given":"Simina","family":"Brânzei","affiliation":""},{"name":"Peter Bro Miltersen","slug":"peter-bro-miltersen","given":"Peter Bro","family":"Miltersen","affiliation":""}],"abstract":"We consider discrete protocols for the classical Steinhaus cake cutting problem. Under mild technical conditions, we show that any deterministic strategy-proof protocol for two agents in the standard Robertson-Webb query model is dictatorial, that is, there is a fixed agent to which the protocol allocates the entire cake. For n > 2 agents, a similar impossibility holds, namely there always exists an agent that gets the empty piece (i.e. no cake). In contrast, we exhibit randomized protocols that are truthful in expectation and compute approximately fair allocations.","doi":null,"url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/74","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/0074.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/74.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/bibtex/74","volume":{"slug":"2015","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2015","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/","year":2015,"location":"Buenos Aires, Argentina","dates":"25–31 July 2015","editors":"Qiang Yang and Michael Wooldridge","isbn":"978-1-57735-738-4","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence","doi_prefix":""},"section":"Game Theory","track":"Main Track","number":74,"pages":{"first":482,"last":487},"keywords":[],"videos":[],"references":[],"license_note":"Copyright International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence."}