Externalities in Cake Cutting
Proceedings of the Twenty-Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Pages 55-60.
Abstract
The cake cutting problem models the fair division of a heterogeneous good between multiple agents. Previous work assumes that each agent derives value only from its own piece. However, agents may also care about the pieces assigned to other agents; such externalities naturally arise in fair division settings. We extend the classical model to capture externalities, and generalize the classical fairness notions of proportionality and envy-freeness. Our technical results characterize the relationship between these generalized properties, establish the existence or nonexistence of fair allocations, and explore the computational feasibility of fairness in the face of externalities.
@inproceedings{ijcai2013p20,
title = {Externalities in Cake Cutting},
author = {Brânzei, Simina and Procaccia, Ariel D. and Zhang, Jie},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Twenty-Third International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-13}},
publisher = {AAAI Press / International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence},
editor = {Francesca Rossi},
pages = {55--60},
year = {2013},
month = {8},
url = {https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2013/20},
}
TY - CPAPER TI - Externalities in Cake Cutting AU - Brânzei, Simina AU - Procaccia, Ariel D. AU - Zhang, Jie T2 - Proceedings of the Twenty-Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-13 PB - AAAI Press / International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence PY - 2013 SP - 55 EP - 60 UR - https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2013/20 ER -Copied
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