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Multilateral Negotiation in Boolean Games with Incomplete Information Using Generalized Possibilistic Logic

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Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Special Track on Knowledge Representation and Reasoning. Pages 2890-2895.

Abstract

Boolean games are a game-theoretic framework in which propositional logic is used to describe agents’ goals. In this paper we investigate how agents in Boolean games can reach an efficient and fair outcome through a simple negotiation protocol. We are particularly interested in settings where agents only have incomplete knowledge about the preferences of others. After explaining how generalized possibilistic logic can be used to compactly encode such knowledge, we analyze how a lack of knowledge affects the agreement outcome. In particular, we show how knowledgeable agents can obtain a more desirable outcome than others.

Sofie De Clercq, Steven Schockaert, Ann Nowé, and Martine De Cock. 2015. Multilateral Negotiation in Boolean Games with Incomplete Information Using Generalized Possibilistic Logic. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-15. IJCAI, 2890–2895. https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/409
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