Verifiable Equilibria in Boolean Games
Proceedings of the Twenty-Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Pages 689-694.
Abstract
This work is motivated by the following concern. Suppose we have a game exhibiting multiple Nash equilibria, with little to distinguish them except that one of them can be verified while the others cannot. That is, one of these equilibria carries sufficient information that, if this is the outcome, then the players can tell that an equilibrium has been played. This provides an argument for this equilibrium being played, instead of the alternatives. Verifiability can thus serve to make an equilibrium a focal point in the game. We formalise and investigate this concept using a model of Boolean games with incomplete information. We define and investigate three increasingly strong types of verifiable equilibria, characterise the complexity of checking these, and show how checking their existence can be captured in a variant of modal epistemic logic.
@inproceedings{ijcai2013p109,
title = {Verifiable Equilibria in Boolean Games},
author = {Ågotnes, Thomas and Harrenstein, Paul and van der Hoek, Wiebe and Wooldridge, Michael J.},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Twenty-Third International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-13}},
publisher = {AAAI Press / International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence},
editor = {Francesca Rossi},
pages = {689--694},
year = {2013},
month = {8},
url = {https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2013/109},
}
TY - CPAPER TI - Verifiable Equilibria in Boolean Games AU - Ågotnes, Thomas AU - Harrenstein, Paul AU - van der Hoek, Wiebe AU - Wooldridge, Michael J. T2 - Proceedings of the Twenty-Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-13 PB - AAAI Press / International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence PY - 2013 SP - 689 EP - 694 UR - https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2013/109 ER -Copied
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