Proceedings

Manipulating Boolean Games through Communication

Download BibTeX Cite

Proceedings of the Twenty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Pages 210-214.

https://doi.org/10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-046

© 2011 International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence

Abstract

We address the issue of manipulating games through communication. In the specific setting we consider (a variation of Boolean games), we assume there is some set of environment variables, the value of which is not directly accessible to players; each player has their own beliefs about these variables, and makes decisions about what actions to perform based on these beliefs. The communication we consider takes the form of (truthful) announcements about the value of some environment variables; the effect of an announcement about some variable is to modify the beliefs of the players who hear the announcement so that they accurately reflect the value of the announced variables. By choosing announcements appropriately, it is possible to perturb the game away from certain rational outcomes and towards others. We specifically focus on the issue of stabilisation: making announcements that transform a game from having no stable states to one that has stable configurations.

  1. C. E. Alchourron, P. Gärdenfors, and D. Makinson. On the logic of theory change. J. of Symb. Logic, 50:510-530, 1985.
  2. Y. Bachrach, et al. The cost of stability in coalitional games. In SAGT 2009.
  3. E. Bonzon, M.-C. Lagasquie, J. Lang, and B. Zanuttini. Boolean games revisited. In ECAI-2006.
  4. E. Bonzon, M.-C. Lagasquie-Schiex, and J. Lang. Dependen- cies between players in Boolean games. IJAR, 50:899-914, 2009.
  5. R. Brafman, C. Domshlak, Y. Engel, and M. Tennenholtz. Planning games. In IJCAI-2009.
  6. P. E. Dunne, S. Kraus, W. van der Hoek, and M. Wooldridge. Cooperative boolean games. In AAMAS-2008.
  7. U. Endriss, S. Kraus, J. Lang, and M. Wooldridge. Designing incentives for boolean games. In AAMAS-2011.
  8. G. Gottlob, G. Greco, and F. Scarcello. Pure Nash equilibria: Hard and easy games. JAIR, 24:357-406, 2005.
  9. J. Grant, S. Kraus, and M. Wooldridge. Intentions in equilib- rium. In AAAI-2010.
  10. J. Y. Halpern. Reasoning about Uncertainty. MIT Press, 2005.
  11. P. Harrenstein, W. van der Hoek, J.-J.Ch. Meyer, and C. Wit- teveen. Boolean games. In TARK VIII, 2001.
  12. E. Maskin. The theory of implementation in Nash equilib- rium: A survey. MIT Department of Economics Working Pa- per, 1983.
  13. D. Monderer and M. Tennenholtz. K-implementation. JAIR, 21:37-62, 2004.
  14. M. J. Osborne and A. Rubinstein. A Course in Game Theory. MIT Press 1994.
  15. C. H. Papadimitriou. Computational Complexity. Addison- Wesley, 1994.
  16. H. van Ditmarsch, W. van der Hoek, and B. Kooi. Dynamic Epistemic Logic. Springer-Verlag, 2007.

References were extracted automatically from the PDF and may contain errors.

Welcome Future Conferences AI Journal Division IJCAI Proceedings About IJCAI IJCAI Awards