Parliamentary Voting Procedures: Agenda Control, Manipulation, and Uncertainty
Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Main Track. Pages 164-169.
Abstract
We study computational problems for two popular parliamentary voting procedures: the amendment procedure and the successive procedure. While finding successful manipulations or agenda controls is tractable for both procedures, our real-world experimental results indicate that most elections cannot be manipulated by a few voters and agenda control is typically impossible. If the voter preferences are incomplete, then finding possible winners is NP-hard for both procedures. Whereas finding necessary winners is coNP-hard for the amendment procedure, it is polynomial-time solvable for the successive one.
@inproceedings{ijcai2015p30,
title = {Parliamentary Voting Procedures: Agenda Control, Manipulation, and Uncertainty},
author = {Bredereck, Robert and Chen, Jiehua and Niedermeier, Rolf and Walsh, Toby},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-15}},
publisher = {International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence},
editor = {Qiang Yang and Michael Wooldridge},
pages = {164--169},
year = {2015},
month = {7},
note = {Main Track},
url = {https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/30},
}
TY - CPAPER TI - Parliamentary Voting Procedures: Agenda Control, Manipulation, and Uncertainty AU - Bredereck, Robert AU - Chen, Jiehua AU - Niedermeier, Rolf AU - Walsh, Toby T2 - Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-15 PB - International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence PY - 2015 SP - 164 EP - 169 UR - https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/30 ER -Copied
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