---
title: "Parliamentary Voting Procedures: Agenda Control, Manipulation, and Uncertainty"
authors:
  - "Robert Bredereck"
  - "Jiehua Chen"
  - "Rolf Niedermeier"
  - "Toby Walsh"
doi: ""
url: "https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/30"
pdf: "https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/0030.pdf"
venue: "Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence"
year: 2015
pages: "164-169"
track: "Main Track"
keywords:
---

# Parliamentary Voting Procedures: Agenda Control, Manipulation, and Uncertainty

Robert Bredereck, Jiehua Chen, Rolf Niedermeier, Toby Walsh

*Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence*, pages 164-169.

## Abstract

We study computational problems for two popular parliamentary voting procedures: the amendment procedure and the successive procedure. While finding successful manipulations or agenda controls is tractable for both procedures, our real-world experimental results indicate that most elections cannot be manipulated by a few voters and agenda control is typically impossible. If the voter preferences are incomplete, then finding possible winners is NP-hard for both procedures. Whereas finding necessary winners is coNP-hard for the amendment procedure, it is polynomial-time solvable for the successive one.