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Tradeoffs between Incentive Mechanisms in Boolean Games

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Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Main Track. Pages 68-73.

Abstract

Two incentive mechanisms for Boolean games were proposed recently - taxation schemes and side payments. Both mechanisms have been shown to be able to secure a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) for Boolean games. A complete characterization of outcomes that can be transformed to PNEs is given for each of the two incentive mechanisms. Side payments are proved to be a weaker mechanism in the sense that the outcomes that they can transform to PNEs are a subset of those transformable by taxation. A family of social-network-based Boolean games, which demonstrates the differences between the two mechanisms for securing a PNE, is presented. A distributed search algorithm for finding the side payments needed for securing a PNE is proposed. An empirical evaluation demonstrates the properties of the two mechanisms on the family of social-network-based Boolean games.

Vadim Levit, Zohar Komarovsky, Tal Grinshpoun, and Amnon Meisels. 2015. Tradeoffs between Incentive Mechanisms in Boolean Games. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-15. IJCAI, 68–73. https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/17
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