Tradeoffs between Incentive Mechanisms in Boolean Games
Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Main Track. Pages 68-73.
Abstract
Two incentive mechanisms for Boolean games were proposed recently - taxation schemes and side payments. Both mechanisms have been shown to be able to secure a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) for Boolean games. A complete characterization of outcomes that can be transformed to PNEs is given for each of the two incentive mechanisms. Side payments are proved to be a weaker mechanism in the sense that the outcomes that they can transform to PNEs are a subset of those transformable by taxation. A family of social-network-based Boolean games, which demonstrates the differences between the two mechanisms for securing a PNE, is presented. A distributed search algorithm for finding the side payments needed for securing a PNE is proposed. An empirical evaluation demonstrates the properties of the two mechanisms on the family of social-network-based Boolean games.
@inproceedings{ijcai2015p17,
title = {Tradeoffs between Incentive Mechanisms in Boolean Games},
author = {Levit, Vadim and Komarovsky, Zohar and Grinshpoun, Tal and Meisels, Amnon},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-15}},
publisher = {International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence},
editor = {Qiang Yang and Michael Wooldridge},
pages = {68--73},
year = {2015},
month = {7},
note = {Main Track},
url = {https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/17},
}
TY - CPAPER TI - Tradeoffs between Incentive Mechanisms in Boolean Games AU - Levit, Vadim AU - Komarovsky, Zohar AU - Grinshpoun, Tal AU - Meisels, Amnon T2 - Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-15 PB - International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence PY - 2015 SP - 68 EP - 73 UR - https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/17 ER -Copied
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