---
title: "Tradeoffs between Incentive Mechanisms in Boolean Games"
authors:
  - "Vadim Levit"
  - "Zohar Komarovsky"
  - "Tal Grinshpoun"
  - "Amnon Meisels"
doi: ""
url: "https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/17"
pdf: "https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/0017.pdf"
venue: "Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence"
year: 2015
pages: "68-73"
track: "Main Track"
keywords:
---

# Tradeoffs between Incentive Mechanisms in Boolean Games

Vadim Levit, Zohar Komarovsky, Tal Grinshpoun, Amnon Meisels

*Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence*, pages 68-73.

## Abstract

Two incentive mechanisms for Boolean games were proposed recently - taxation schemes and side payments. Both mechanisms have been shown to be able to secure a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) for Boolean games. A complete characterization of outcomes that can be transformed to PNEs is given for each of the two incentive mechanisms. Side payments are proved to be a weaker mechanism in the sense that the outcomes that they can transform to PNEs are a subset of those transformable by taxation. A family of social-network-based Boolean games, which demonstrates the differences between the two mechanisms for securing a PNE, is presented. A distributed search algorithm for finding the side payments needed for securing a PNE is proposed. An empirical evaluation demonstrates the properties of the two mechanisms on the family of social-network-based Boolean games.