{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Tradeoffs between Incentive Mechanisms in Boolean Games","authors":[{"name":"Vadim Levit","slug":"vadim-levit","given":"Vadim","family":"Levit","affiliation":""},{"name":"Zohar Komarovsky","slug":"zohar-komarovsky","given":"Zohar","family":"Komarovsky","affiliation":""},{"name":"Tal Grinshpoun","slug":"tal-grinshpoun","given":"Tal","family":"Grinshpoun","affiliation":""},{"name":"Amnon Meisels","slug":"amnon-meisels","given":"Amnon","family":"Meisels","affiliation":""}],"abstract":"Two incentive mechanisms for Boolean games were proposed recently - taxation schemes and side payments. Both mechanisms have been shown to be able to secure a pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) for Boolean games. A complete characterization of outcomes that can be transformed to PNEs is given for each of the two incentive mechanisms. Side payments are proved to be a weaker mechanism in the sense that the outcomes that they can transform to PNEs are a subset of those transformable by taxation. A family of social-network-based Boolean games, which demonstrates the differences between the two mechanisms for securing a PNE, is presented. A distributed search algorithm for finding the side payments needed for securing a PNE is proposed. An empirical evaluation demonstrates the properties of the two mechanisms on the family of social-network-based Boolean games.","doi":null,"url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/17","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/0017.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/17.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/bibtex/17","volume":{"slug":"2015","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2015","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/","year":2015,"location":"Buenos Aires, Argentina","dates":"25–31 July 2015","editors":"Qiang Yang and Michael Wooldridge","isbn":"978-1-57735-738-4","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence","doi_prefix":""},"section":"Agent and Multiagent Systems","track":"Main Track","number":17,"pages":{"first":68,"last":73},"keywords":[],"videos":[],"references":[],"license_note":"Copyright International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence."}