Dynamics of Profit-Sharing Games
Proceedings of the Twenty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Pages 37-41.
Abstract
An important task in the analysis of multiagent systems is to understand how groups of selfish players can form coalitions, i.e., work together in teams. In this paper, we study the dynamics of coalition formation under bounded rationality. We consider settings where each team's profit is given by a concave function, and propose three profit-sharing schemes, each of which is based on the concept of marginal utility. The agents are assumed to be myopic, i.e., they keep changing teams as long as they can increase their payoff by doing so. We study the properties (such as closeness to Nash equilibrium or total profit) of the states that result after a polynomial number of such moves, and prove bounds on the price of anarchy and the price of stability of the corresponding games.
@inproceedings{ijcai2011p18,
title = {Dynamics of Profit-Sharing Games},
author = {Augustine, John and Chen, Ning and Elkind, Edith and Fanelli, Angelo and Gravin, Nick and Shiryaev, Dmitry},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Twenty-Second International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-11}},
publisher = {AAAI Press/International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence},
editor = {Toby Walsh},
pages = {37--41},
year = {2011},
month = {7},
doi = {10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-018},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-018},
}
TY - CPAPER TI - Dynamics of Profit-Sharing Games AU - Augustine, John AU - Chen, Ning AU - Elkind, Edith AU - Fanelli, Angelo AU - Gravin, Nick AU - Shiryaev, Dmitry T2 - Proceedings of the Twenty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-11 PB - AAAI Press/International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence PY - 2011 SP - 37 EP - 41 DO - 10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-018 UR - https://doi.org/10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-018 ER -Copied
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