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Hustling in Repeated Zero-Sum Games with Imperfect Execution

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Proceedings of the Twenty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Pages 31-35.

https://doi.org/10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-017

Abstract

We study repeated games in which players have imperfect execution skill and one player's true skill is not common knowledge. In these settings the possibility arises of a player hustling, or pretending to have lower execution skill than they actually have. Focusing on repeated zero-sum games, we provide a hustle-proof strategy; this strategy maximizes a player's payoff, regardless of the true skill level of the other player.

Christopher Archibald, and Yoav Shoham. 2011. Hustling in Repeated Zero-Sum Games with Imperfect Execution. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-11. IJCAI, 31–35. https://doi.org/10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-017
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