{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Dynamics of Profit-Sharing Games","authors":[{"name":"John Augustine","slug":"john-augustine","given":"John","family":"Augustine","affiliation":""},{"name":"Ning Chen","slug":"ning-chen","given":"Ning","family":"Chen","affiliation":""},{"name":"Edith Elkind","slug":"edith-elkind","given":"Edith","family":"Elkind","affiliation":""},{"name":"Angelo Fanelli","slug":"angelo-fanelli","given":"Angelo","family":"Fanelli","affiliation":""},{"name":"Nick Gravin","slug":"nick-gravin","given":"Nick","family":"Gravin","affiliation":""},{"name":"Dmitry Shiryaev","slug":"dmitry-shiryaev","given":"Dmitry","family":"Shiryaev","affiliation":""}],"abstract":"An important task in the analysis of multiagent systems is to understand how groups of selfish players can form coalitions, i.e., work together in teams. In this paper, we study the dynamics of coalition formation under bounded rationality. We consider settings where each team's profit is given by a concave function, and propose three profit-sharing schemes, each of which is based on the concept of marginal utility. The agents are assumed to be myopic, i.e., they keep changing teams as long as they can increase their payoff by doing so. We study the properties (such as closeness to Nash equilibrium or total profit) of the states that result after a polynomial number of such moves, and prove bounds on the price of anarchy and the price of stability of the corresponding games.","doi":"10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-018","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2011/18","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2011/0018.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2011/18.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2011/bibtex/18","volume":{"slug":"2011","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2011","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2011/","year":2011,"location":"Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain","dates":"16–22 July 2011","editors":"Toby Walsh","isbn":"978-1-57735-512-0; 978-1-57735-513-7; 978-1-57735-514-4; 978-1-57735-515-1; 978-1-57735-516-8","publisher":"AAAI Press/International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence","doi_prefix":""},"section":null,"track":"","number":18,"pages":{"first":37,"last":41},"keywords":[],"videos":[],"references":[],"license_note":"Copyright International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence."}