---
title: "Hustling in Repeated Zero-Sum Games with Imperfect Execution"
authors:
  - "Christopher Archibald"
  - "Yoav Shoham"
doi: "10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-017"
url: "https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2011/17"
pdf: "https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2011/0017.pdf"
venue: "Proceedings of the Twenty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence"
year: 2011
pages: "31-35"
track: ""
keywords:
---

# Hustling in Repeated Zero-Sum Games with Imperfect Execution

Christopher Archibald, Yoav Shoham

*Proceedings of the Twenty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence*, pages 31-35. DOI: [10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-017](https://doi.org/10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-017)

## Abstract

We study repeated games in which players have imperfect execution skill and one player's true skill is not common knowledge. In these settings the possibility arises of a player hustling, or pretending to have lower execution skill than they actually have. Focusing on repeated zero-sum games, we provide a hustle-proof strategy; this strategy maximizes a player's payoff, regardless of the true skill level of the other player.