A Truthful Multiunit Profit-Optimal Mechanism for Synthesizing Social Laws
Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Main Track. Pages 3550-3557.
https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2026/395
Keywords
- Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: Mechanism design
- Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: Auctions and market-based systems
Abstract
Social Law Synthesis (SLS) in strategic environments is a novel multi-unit mechanism design problem, spanning modeling to computational challenges. We derive a method to specify the problem succinctly, reduce payment determination to allocation determination, and design an integer linear programming (ILP)-based algorithm that further reduces allocation to a polynomial-time ILP formulation. This offloads intractability to powerful ILP solvers, yielding a truthful, individually rational, and profit-optimal mechanism.
@inproceedings{ijcai2026p395,
title = {A Truthful Multiunit Profit-Optimal Mechanism for Synthesizing Social Laws},
author = {Wu, Jun and Huang, Jian and Wang, Chongjun},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-26}},
publisher = {International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization},
editor = {Diego Calvanese},
pages = {3550--3557},
year = {2026},
month = {8},
note = {Main Track},
doi = {10.24963/ijcai.2026/395},
url = {https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2026/395},
}
TY - CPAPER TI - A Truthful Multiunit Profit-Optimal Mechanism for Synthesizing Social Laws AU - Wu, Jun AU - Huang, Jian AU - Wang, Chongjun T2 - Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-26 PB - International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization PY - 2026 SP - 3550 EP - 3557 DO - 10.24963/ijcai.2026/395 UR - https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2026/395 ER -Copied
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