{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"A Truthful Multiunit Profit-Optimal Mechanism for Synthesizing Social Laws","authors":[{"name":"Jun Wu","slug":"jun-wu","given":"Jun","family":"Wu","affiliation":""},{"name":"Jian Huang","slug":"jian-huang","given":"Jian","family":"Huang","affiliation":""},{"name":"Chongjun Wang","slug":"chongjun-wang","given":"Chongjun","family":"Wang","affiliation":""}],"abstract":"Social Law Synthesis (SLS) in strategic environments is a novel multi-unit mechanism design problem, spanning modeling to computational challenges. We derive a method to specify the problem succinctly, reduce payment determination to allocation determination, and design an integer linear programming (ILP)-based algorithm that further reduces allocation to a polynomial-time ILP formulation. This offloads intractability to powerful ILP solvers, yielding a truthful, individually rational, and profit-optimal mechanism.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2026/395","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2026/395","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2026/0395.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2026/395.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2026/bibtex/395","volume":{"slug":"2026","title":"Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2026","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2026/","year":2026,"location":"Bremen, Germany","dates":"15-21 August 2026","editors":"Diego Calvanese","isbn":"978-1-956792-09-6","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2026"},"section":"Game Theory and Economic Paradigms","track":"Main Track","number":395,"pages":{"first":3550,"last":3557},"keywords":["Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: Mechanism design","Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: Auctions and market-based systems"],"videos":[],"references":[],"license_note":"Copyright International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence."}