---
title: "A Truthful Multiunit Profit-Optimal Mechanism for Synthesizing Social Laws"
authors:
  - "Jun Wu"
  - "Jian Huang"
  - "Chongjun Wang"
doi: "10.24963/ijcai.2026/395"
url: "https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2026/395"
pdf: "https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2026/0395.pdf"
venue: "Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence"
year: 2026
pages: "3550-3557"
track: "Main Track"
keywords:
  - "Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: Mechanism design"
  - "Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: Auctions and market-based systems"
---

# A Truthful Multiunit Profit-Optimal Mechanism for Synthesizing Social Laws

Jun Wu, Jian Huang, Chongjun Wang

*Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence*, pages 3550-3557. DOI: [10.24963/ijcai.2026/395](https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2026/395)

## Abstract

Social Law Synthesis (SLS) in strategic environments is a novel multi-unit mechanism design problem, spanning modeling to computational challenges. We derive a method to specify the problem succinctly, reduce payment determination to allocation determination, and design an integer linear programming (ILP)-based algorithm that further reduces allocation to a polynomial-time ILP formulation. This offloads intractability to powerful ILP solvers, yielding a truthful, individually rational, and profit-optimal mechanism.