A Little Subsidy Ensures MMS Allocation for Three Agents
Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Main Track. Pages 4073-4081.
https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2025/454
Keywords
- Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: GTEP: Computational social choice
- Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: GTEP: Fair division
Abstract
We consider the problem of fair allocation of m indivisible items to a group of n agents with subsidies (money). We address scenarios where agents have general additive cost/utility functions. Our work primarily focuses on the special case of three agents. Assuming that the maximum cost/utility of an item to an agent can be compensated by one dollar, we demonstrate that a total subsidy of 1/6 dollars is sufficient to ensure the existence of Maximin Share (MMS) allocations for both goods and chores. Additionally, we provide examples to establish the lower bounds of the required subsidies.
@inproceedings{ijcai2025p454,
title = {A Little Subsidy Ensures MMS Allocation for Three Agents},
author = {Wu, Xiaowei and Xue, Quan and Zhou, Shengwei},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-25}},
publisher = {International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization},
editor = {James Kwok},
pages = {4073--4081},
year = {2025},
month = {8},
note = {Main Track},
doi = {10.24963/ijcai.2025/454},
url = {https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2025/454},
}
TY - CPAPER TI - A Little Subsidy Ensures MMS Allocation for Three Agents AU - Wu, Xiaowei AU - Xue, Quan AU - Zhou, Shengwei T2 - Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-25 PB - International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization PY - 2025 SP - 4073 EP - 4081 DO - 10.24963/ijcai.2025/454 UR - https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2025/454 ER -Copied
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