{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"A Little Subsidy Ensures MMS Allocation for Three Agents","authors":[{"name":"Xiaowei Wu","slug":"xiaowei-wu","given":"Xiaowei","family":"Wu","affiliation":""},{"name":"Quan Xue","slug":"quan-xue","given":"Quan","family":"Xue","affiliation":""},{"name":"Shengwei Zhou","slug":"shengwei-zhou","given":"Shengwei","family":"Zhou","affiliation":""}],"abstract":"We consider the problem of fair allocation of m indivisible items to a group of n agents with subsidies (money). We address scenarios where agents have general additive cost/utility functions. Our work primarily focuses on the special case of three agents. Assuming that the maximum cost/utility of an item to an agent can be compensated by one dollar, we demonstrate that a total subsidy of 1/6 dollars is sufficient to ensure the existence of Maximin Share (MMS) allocations for both goods and chores. Additionally, we provide examples to establish the lower bounds of the required subsidies.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2025/454","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2025/454","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2025/0454.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2025/454.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2025/bibtex/454","volume":{"slug":"2025","title":"Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2025","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2025/","year":2025,"location":"Montreal, Canada","dates":"16-22 August 2025","editors":"James Kwok","isbn":"978-1-956792-06-5","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2025"},"section":"Game Theory and Economic Paradigms","track":"Main Track","number":454,"pages":{"first":4073,"last":4081},"keywords":["Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: GTEP: Computational social choice","Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: GTEP: Fair division"],"videos":[],"references":[],"license_note":"Copyright International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence."}