Efficient Algorithms for Electing Successive Committees
Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Main Track. Pages 3916-3924.
https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2025/436
Keywords
- Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: GTEP: Computational social choice
Abstract
In a recently introduced model of successive committee elections, for a given set of ordinal or approval preferences one aims to find a sequence of a given length of “best” same-size committees such that each candidate is a member of a limited number of consecutive committees. However, the practical usability of this model remains limited, as the described task turns out to be NP-hard for most selection criteria already for seeking committees of size three. Non-trivial or somewhat efficient algorithms for these cases are lacking too. Motivated by a desire to unlock the full potential of the described temporal model of committee elections, we devise (parameterized) algorithms that effectively solve the mentioned hard cases in realistic scenarios of a moderate number of candidates or of a limited time horizon.
@inproceedings{ijcai2025p436,
title = {Efficient Algorithms for Electing Successive Committees},
author = {Jain, Pallavi and Kaczmarczyk, Andrzej},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-25}},
publisher = {International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization},
editor = {James Kwok},
pages = {3916--3924},
year = {2025},
month = {8},
note = {Main Track},
doi = {10.24963/ijcai.2025/436},
url = {https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2025/436},
}
TY - CPAPER TI - Efficient Algorithms for Electing Successive Committees AU - Jain, Pallavi AU - Kaczmarczyk, Andrzej T2 - Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-25 PB - International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization PY - 2025 SP - 3916 EP - 3924 DO - 10.24963/ijcai.2025/436 UR - https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2025/436 ER -Copied
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