---
title: "Efficient Algorithms for Electing Successive Committees"
authors:
  - "Pallavi Jain"
  - "Andrzej Kaczmarczyk"
doi: "10.24963/ijcai.2025/436"
url: "https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2025/436"
pdf: "https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2025/0436.pdf"
venue: "Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence"
year: 2025
pages: "3916-3924"
track: "Main Track"
keywords:
  - "Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: GTEP: Computational social choice"
---

# Efficient Algorithms for Electing Successive Committees

Pallavi Jain, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk

*Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence*, pages 3916-3924. DOI: [10.24963/ijcai.2025/436](https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2025/436)

## Abstract

In a recently introduced model of successive committee elections, for a given set of ordinal or approval preferences one aims to find a sequence of a given length of “best” same-size committees such that each candidate is a member of a limited number of consecutive committees. However, the practical usability of this model remains limited, as the described task turns out to be NP-hard for most selection criteria already for seeking committees of size three. Non-trivial or somewhat efficient algorithms for these cases are lacking too. Motivated by a desire to unlock the full potential of the described temporal model of committee elections, we devise (parameterized) algorithms that effectively solve the mentioned hard cases in realistic scenarios of a moderate number of candidates or of a limited time horizon.