Online Housing Market
Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Main Track. Pages 3925-3933.
https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2025/437
Keywords
- Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: GTEP: Computational social choice
- Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: GTEP: Auctions and market-based systems
- Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: GTEP: Mechanism design
Abstract
We study an online variant of the celebrated housing market problem, where each agent owns a single house and seeks to exchange it based on her preferences. In this online setting, agents may arrive and depart at any time, meaning not all agents are present in the housing market simultaneously. We extend the well-known serial dictatorship and top trading cycle mechanisms to the online scenario, aiming to retain their desirable properties, such as Pareto efficiency, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness. These extensions also seek to prevent agents from strategically delaying their arrivals or advancing their departures. We demonstrate that achieving all these properties simultaneously is impossible and present several variants that achieve different subsets of these properties.
@inproceedings{ijcai2025p437,
title = {Online Housing Market},
author = {Lesca, Julien},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-25}},
publisher = {International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization},
editor = {James Kwok},
pages = {3925--3933},
year = {2025},
month = {8},
note = {Main Track},
doi = {10.24963/ijcai.2025/437},
url = {https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2025/437},
}
TY - CPAPER TI - Online Housing Market AU - Lesca, Julien T2 - Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-25 PB - International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization PY - 2025 SP - 3925 EP - 3933 DO - 10.24963/ijcai.2025/437 UR - https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2025/437 ER -Copied
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