Non-Myopic Negotiators See What's Best
Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Main Track. Pages 2047-2053.
Abstract
We consider revenue negotiation problems in iterative settings. In our model, a group of agentshas some initial resources, used in order to generate revenue. Agents must agree on some way of dividing resources, but there’s a twist. At every time-step, the revenue shares received at time t are agent resources at time t + 1, and the game is repeated. The key issue here is that the way resources are shared has a dramatic effect on long term social welfare, so in order to maximize individual long-term revenue one must consider the welfare of others, a behavior not captured by other models of cooperation and bargaining. Our work focuses on homogeneous production functions. We identify conditions that ensure that the socially optimal outcome is an epsilon-Nash equilibrium. We apply our results to some families of utility functions, and discuss their strategic implications.
@inproceedings{ijcai2015p290,
title = {Non-Myopic Negotiators See What's Best},
author = {Zick, Yair and Bachrach, Yoram and Kash, Ian A. and Key, Peter B.},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-15}},
publisher = {International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence},
editor = {Qiang Yang and Michael Wooldridge},
pages = {2047--2053},
year = {2015},
month = {7},
note = {Main Track},
url = {https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/290},
}
TY - CPAPER TI - Non-Myopic Negotiators See What's Best AU - Zick, Yair AU - Bachrach, Yoram AU - Kash, Ian A. AU - Key, Peter B. T2 - Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-15 PB - International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence PY - 2015 SP - 2047 EP - 2053 UR - https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/290 ER -Copied
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