{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Non-Myopic Negotiators See What's Best","authors":[{"name":"Yair Zick","slug":"yair-zick","given":"Yair","family":"Zick","affiliation":""},{"name":"Yoram Bachrach","slug":"yoram-bachrach","given":"Yoram","family":"Bachrach","affiliation":""},{"name":"Ian A. Kash","slug":"ian-a-kash","given":"Ian A.","family":"Kash","affiliation":""},{"name":"Peter B. Key","slug":"peter-b-key","given":"Peter B.","family":"Key","affiliation":""}],"abstract":"We consider revenue negotiation problems in iterative settings. In our model, a group of agentshas some initial resources, used in order to generate revenue. Agents must agree on some way of dividing resources, but there’s a twist. At every time-step, the revenue shares received at time t are agent resources at time t + 1, and the game is repeated. The key issue here is that the way resources are shared has a dramatic effect on long term social welfare, so in order to maximize individual long-term revenue one must consider the welfare of others, a behavior not captured by other models of cooperation and bargaining. Our work focuses on homogeneous production functions. We identify conditions that ensure that the socially optimal outcome is an epsilon-Nash equilibrium. We apply our results to some families of utility functions, and discuss their strategic implications.","doi":null,"url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/290","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/0290.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/290.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/bibtex/290","volume":{"slug":"2015","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2015","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/","year":2015,"location":"Buenos Aires, Argentina","dates":"25–31 July 2015","editors":"Qiang Yang and Michael Wooldridge","isbn":"978-1-57735-738-4","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence","doi_prefix":""},"section":"Social Choice Theory","track":"Main Track","number":290,"pages":{"first":2047,"last":2053},"keywords":[],"videos":[],"references":[],"license_note":"Copyright International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence."}