---
title: "Non-Myopic Negotiators See What's Best"
authors:
  - "Yair Zick"
  - "Yoram Bachrach"
  - "Ian A. Kash"
  - "Peter B. Key"
doi: ""
url: "https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/290"
pdf: "https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/0290.pdf"
venue: "Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence"
year: 2015
pages: "2047-2053"
track: "Main Track"
keywords:
---

# Non-Myopic Negotiators See What's Best

Yair Zick, Yoram Bachrach, Ian A. Kash, Peter B. Key

*Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence*, pages 2047-2053.

## Abstract

We consider revenue negotiation problems in iterative settings. In our model, a group of agentshas some initial resources, used in order to generate revenue. Agents must agree on some way of dividing resources, but there’s a twist. At every time-step, the revenue shares received at time t are agent resources at time t + 1, and the game is repeated. The key issue here is that the way resources are shared has a dramatic effect on long term social welfare, so in order to maximize individual long-term revenue one must consider the welfare of others, a behavior not captured by other models of cooperation and bargaining. Our work focuses on homogeneous production functions. We identify conditions that ensure that the socially optimal outcome is an epsilon-Nash equilibrium. We apply our results to some families of utility functions, and discuss their strategic implications.