Defender (Mis)coordination in Security Games
Proceedings of the Twenty-Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Pages 220-225.
Abstract
We study security games with multiple defenders. To achieve maximum security, defenders must perfectly synchronize their randomized allocations of resources. However, in real-life scenarios (such as protection of the port of Boston) this is not the case. Our goal is to quantify the loss incurred by miscoordination between defenders, both theoretically and empirically. We introduce two notions that capture this loss under different assumptions: the price of miscoordination, and the price of sequential commitment. Generally speaking, our theoretical bounds indicate that the loss may be extremely high in the worst case, while our simulations establish a smaller yet significant loss in practice.
@inproceedings{ijcai2013p42,
title = {Defender (Mis)coordination in Security Games},
author = {Jiang, Albert Xin and Procaccia, Ariel D. and Qian, Yundi and Shah, Nisarg and Tambe, Milind},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Twenty-Third International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-13}},
publisher = {AAAI Press / International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence},
editor = {Francesca Rossi},
pages = {220--225},
year = {2013},
month = {8},
url = {https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2013/42},
}
TY - CPAPER TI - Defender (Mis)coordination in Security Games AU - Jiang, Albert Xin AU - Procaccia, Ariel D. AU - Qian, Yundi AU - Shah, Nisarg AU - Tambe, Milind T2 - Proceedings of the Twenty-Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-13 PB - AAAI Press / International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence PY - 2013 SP - 220 EP - 225 UR - https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2013/42 ER -Copied
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