Group-Strategyproof Irresolute Social Choice Functions
Proceedings of the Twenty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Pages 79-83.
Abstract
An important problem in voting is that agents may misrepresent their preferences in order to obtain a more preferred outcome. Unfortunately, this phenomenon has been shown to be inevitable in the case of resolute, i.e., single-valued, social choice functions. In this paper, we introduce a variant of Maskin-monotonicity that completely characterizes the class of pairwise irresolute social choice functions that are group-strategyproof according to Kelly's preference extension.The class is narrow but contains a number of appealing Condorcet extensions such as the minimal covering set and the bipartisan set, thereby answering a question raised independently by Barbera (1977) and Kelly (1977). These functions furthermore encourage participation and thus do not suffer from the no-show paradox (under Kelly's extension).
@inproceedings{ijcai2011p25,
title = {Group-Strategyproof Irresolute Social Choice Functions},
author = {Brandt, Felix},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Twenty-Second International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-11}},
publisher = {AAAI Press/International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence},
editor = {Toby Walsh},
pages = {79--83},
year = {2011},
month = {7},
doi = {10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-025},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-025},
}
TY - CPAPER TI - Group-Strategyproof Irresolute Social Choice Functions AU - Brandt, Felix T2 - Proceedings of the Twenty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-11 PB - AAAI Press/International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence PY - 2011 SP - 79 EP - 83 DO - 10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-025 UR - https://doi.org/10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-025 ER -Copied
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