{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Group-Strategyproof Irresolute Social Choice Functions","authors":[{"name":"Felix Brandt","slug":"felix-brandt","given":"Felix","family":"Brandt","affiliation":""}],"abstract":"An important problem in voting is that agents may misrepresent their preferences in order to obtain a more preferred outcome. Unfortunately, this phenomenon has been shown to be inevitable in the case of resolute, i.e., single-valued, social choice functions. In this paper, we introduce a variant of Maskin-monotonicity that completely characterizes the class of pairwise irresolute social choice functions that are group-strategyproof according to Kelly's preference extension.The class is narrow but contains a number of appealing Condorcet extensions such as the minimal covering set and the bipartisan set, thereby answering a question raised independently by Barbera (1977) and Kelly (1977). These functions furthermore encourage participation and thus do not suffer from the no-show paradox (under Kelly's extension).","doi":"10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-025","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2011/25","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2011/0025.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2011/25.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2011/bibtex/25","volume":{"slug":"2011","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2011","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2011/","year":2011,"location":"Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain","dates":"16–22 July 2011","editors":"Toby Walsh","isbn":"978-1-57735-512-0; 978-1-57735-513-7; 978-1-57735-514-4; 978-1-57735-515-1; 978-1-57735-516-8","publisher":"AAAI Press/International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence","doi_prefix":""},"section":null,"track":"","number":25,"pages":{"first":79,"last":83},"keywords":[],"videos":[],"references":[],"license_note":"Copyright International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence."}