Efficiency and Equilibrium in Task Allocation Economies with Hierarchical Dependencies
Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Distributed AI. Pages 520-525.
Abstract
We analyze economic efficiency and equilibrium properties in decentralized task allocation problems involving hierarchical dependencies and resource contention. We bound the inefficiency of a type of approximate equilibrium in proportion to the number of agents and the bidding parameters in a particular market protocol. This protocol converges to an approximate equilibrium with respect to all agents, except those which may acquire unneeded inputs. We introduce a decommitment phase to allow such agents to decommit from their input contracts. Experiments indicate that the augmented market protocol produces highly efficient allocations on average.
@inproceedings{ijcai1999p75,
title = {Efficiency and Equilibrium in Task Allocation Economies with Hierarchical Dependencies},
author = {Walsh, William E. and Wellman, Michael P.},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-99}},
publisher = {International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence},
editor = {Thomas Dean},
pages = {520--525},
year = {1999},
note = {Distributed AI},
url = {https://ijcai.org/proceedings/1999/75},
}
TY - CPAPER TI - Efficiency and Equilibrium in Task Allocation Economies with Hierarchical Dependencies AU - Walsh, William E. AU - Wellman, Michael P. T2 - Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-99 PB - International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence PY - 1999 SP - 520 EP - 525 UR - https://ijcai.org/proceedings/1999/75 ER -Copied
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