Stability Under Valuation Updates in Coalition Formation
Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Main Track. Pages 3418-3426.
https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2026/380
Keywords
- Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: Computational social choice
- Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: Cooperative games
Abstract
Coalition formation studies how to partition a set of agents into disjoint coalitions based on their preferences. In this paper,
we consider the class of additively separable hedonic games and study the setting in which agents' valuations of each other evolve over time. Since rearranging coalitions can be costly, our goal is to find a stable partition close to the current one, where distance is measured by the number of agents that must change coalition.
We study this problem for four stability notions based on single-agent deviations: Nash, individual, contractual Nash, and contractual individual stability. For all four, deciding whether a close stable partition exists is NP-complete, even under severe restrictions on the valuations and even when only a single valuation changes. On the positive side, we give polynomial-time algorithms for the two contractual notions under restricted symmetric valuations, and show that over long sequences of updates, these algorithms maintain stability with constant average reconfiguration cost.
@inproceedings{ijcai2026p380,
title = {Stability Under Valuation Updates in Coalition Formation},
author = {Frank, Fabian and Novaković, Matija and Romen, Rene},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-26}},
publisher = {International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization},
editor = {Diego Calvanese},
pages = {3418--3426},
year = {2026},
month = {8},
note = {Main Track},
doi = {10.24963/ijcai.2026/380},
url = {https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2026/380},
}
TY - CPAPER TI - Stability Under Valuation Updates in Coalition Formation AU - Frank, Fabian AU - Novaković, Matija AU - Romen, Rene T2 - Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-26 PB - International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization PY - 2026 SP - 3418 EP - 3426 DO - 10.24963/ijcai.2026/380 UR - https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2026/380 ER -Copied
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