Voting by Axioms (Extended Abstract)

Voting by Axioms (Extended Abstract)

Marie Christin Schmidtlein, Ulle Endriss

Proceedings of the Thirty-Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Sister Conferences Best Papers. Pages 8455-8459. https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2024/941

We develop an approach for collective decision making from first principles. In this approach, rather than using a---necessarily imperfect---voting rule to map any given scenario where individual agents report their preferences into a collective decision, we identify for every concrete such scenario the most appealing set of normative principles (known as axioms in social choice theory) that would entail a unique decision and then implement that decision. We analyse some of the fundamental properties of this new approach, from both an algorithmic and a normative point of view.
Keywords:
Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: GTEP: Computational social choice