Automated Synthesis of Mechanisms

Munyque Mittelmann, Bastien Maubert, Aniello Murano, Laurent Perrussel

Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Main Track. Pages 426-432.

https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2022/61

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Abstract

Mechanism Design aims to design a game so that a desirable outcome is reached regardless of agents' self-interests. In this paper, we show how this problem can be rephrased as a synthesis problem, where mechanisms are automatically synthesized from a partial or complete specification in a high-level logical language. We show that Quantitative Strategy Logic is a perfect candidate for specifying mechanisms as it can express complex strategic and quantitative properties. We solve automated mechanism design in two cases: when the number of actions is bounded, and when agents play in turn.

Keywords

  • Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Formal Verification, Validation and Synthesis
  • Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Mechanism Design
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