Proceedings

Shortlisting Rules and Incentives in an End-to-End Model for Participatory Budgeting

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Proceedings of the Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Main Track. Pages 370-376.

https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2021/52

Abstract

We introduce an end-to-end model for participatory

budgeting grounded in social choice theory. Our

model accounts for the interplay between the two

stages commonly encountered in real-life partici-

patory budgeting. In the first stage participants pro-

pose projects to be shortlisted, while in the second

stage they vote on which of the shortlisted projects

should be funded. Prior work of a formal nature has

focused on analysing the second stage only. We in-

troduce several shortlisting rules for the first stage

and analyse them in both normative and algorith-

mic terms. Our main focus is on the incentives of

participants to engage in strategic behaviour during

the first stage, in which they need to reason about

how their proposals will impact the range of strate-

gies available to everyone in the second stage.

Simon Rey, Ulle Endriss, and Ronald de Haan. 2021. Shortlisting Rules and Incentives in an End-to-End Model for Participatory Budgeting. In Proceedings of the Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-21. IJCAI, 370–376. https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2021/52
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