Fairness in Long-Term Participatory Budgeting
Proceedings of the Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Main Track. Pages 299-305.
https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2021/42
Keywords
- Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Computational Social Choice
- Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Voting
Abstract
Participatory Budgeting (PB) processes are usually designed to span several years, with referenda for new budget allocations taking place regularly. This paper presents a first formal framework for long-term PB, based on a sequence of budgeting problems as main input. We introduce a theory of fairness for this setting, focusing on three main concepts that apply to types (groups) of voters:
(i) achieving equal welfare for all types, (ii) minimizing inequality of welfare (as measured by the Gini coefficient), and (iii) achieving equal welfare in the long run.
We investigate under which conditions these criteria can be satisfied, and analyze the computational complexity of verifying whether they hold.
@inproceedings{ijcai2021p42,
title = {Fairness in Long-Term Participatory Budgeting},
author = {Lackner, Martin and Maly, Jan and Rey, Simon},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Thirtieth International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-21}},
publisher = {International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization},
editor = {Prof. Zhi-Hua Zhou},
pages = {299--305},
year = {2021},
month = {8},
note = {Main Track},
doi = {10.24963/ijcai.2021/42},
url = {https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2021/42},
}
TY - CPAPER TI - Fairness in Long-Term Participatory Budgeting AU - Lackner, Martin AU - Maly, Jan AU - Rey, Simon T2 - Proceedings of the Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-21 PB - International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization PY - 2021 SP - 299 EP - 305 DO - 10.24963/ijcai.2021/42 UR - https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2021/42 ER -Copied
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