Fair and Efficient Resource Allocation with Partial Information
Proceedings of the Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Main Track. Pages 224-230.
https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2021/32
Keywords
- Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Resource Allocation
- Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Computational Social Choice
- AI Ethics, Trust, Fairness: Fairness
Abstract
We study the fundamental problem of allocating indivisible goods to agents with additive preferences. We consider eliciting from each agent only a ranking of her k most preferred goods instead of her full cardinal valuations. We characterize the amount of preference information that must be elicited in order to satisfy envy-freeness up to one good and approximate maximin share guarantee, two widely studied fairness notions. We also analyze the multiplicative loss in social welfare incurred due to the lack of full information with and without fairness requirements.
@inproceedings{ijcai2021p32,
title = {Fair and Efficient Resource Allocation with Partial Information},
author = {Halpern, Daniel and Shah, Nisarg},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Thirtieth International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-21}},
publisher = {International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization},
editor = {Prof. Zhi-Hua Zhou},
pages = {224--230},
year = {2021},
month = {8},
note = {Main Track},
doi = {10.24963/ijcai.2021/32},
url = {https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2021/32},
}
TY - CPAPER TI - Fair and Efficient Resource Allocation with Partial Information AU - Halpern, Daniel AU - Shah, Nisarg T2 - Proceedings of the Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-21 PB - International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization PY - 2021 SP - 224 EP - 230 DO - 10.24963/ijcai.2021/32 UR - https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2021/32 ER -Copied
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