Convexity of b-matching Games

Soh Kumabe, Takanori Maehara

Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Main track. Pages 261-267.

https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2020/37

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Abstract

The b-matching game is a cooperative game defined on a graph.

The game generalizes the matching game to allow each individual to have more than one partner.

The game has several applications, such as the roommate assignment, the multi-item version of the seller-buyer assignment, and the international kidney exchange.

Compared with the standard matching game, the b-matching game is computationally hard.

In particular, the core non-emptiness problem and the core membership problem are co-NP-hard.

Therefore, we focus on the convexity of the game, which is a sufficient condition of the core non-emptiness and often more tractable concept than the core non-emptiness.

It also has several additional benefits.

In this study, we give a necessary and sufficient condition of the convexity of the b-matching game.

This condition also gives an O(n log n + m α(n)) time algorithm to determine whether a given game is convex or not, where n and m are the number of vertices and edges of a given graph, respectively, and α(・) is the inverse-Ackermann function.

Using our characterization, we also give a polynomial-time algorithm to compute the Shapley value of a convex b-matching game.

Keywords

  • Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Algorithmic Game Theory
  • Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Cooperative Games
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