Strategic Campaign Management in Apportionment Elections

Robert Bredereck, Piotr Faliszewski, Michal Furdyna, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk, Martin Lackner

Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Main track. Pages 103-109.

https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2020/15

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Abstract

In parliamentary elections, parties compete for a limited, typically fixed number of seats. We study the complexity of the following bribery-style problem: Given the distribution of votes among the parties, what is the smallest number of voters that need to be convinced to vote for our party, so that it gets a desired number of seats. We also run extensive experiments on real-world election data and measure the effectiveness of our method.

Keywords

  • Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Voting
  • Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Computational Social Choice
  • Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Algorithmic Game Theory
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