{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Strategic Campaign Management in Apportionment Elections","authors":[{"name":"Robert Bredereck","slug":"robert-bredereck","given":"Robert","family":"Bredereck","affiliation":"Technische Universität Berlin , Chair of Algorithmics and Computational Complexity , Berlin , Germany"},{"name":"Piotr Faliszewski","slug":"piotr-faliszewski","given":"Piotr","family":"Faliszewski","affiliation":"AGH University , Kraków , Poland"},{"name":"Michal Furdyna","slug":"michal-furdyna","given":"Michal","family":"Furdyna","affiliation":"AGH University , Kraków , Poland"},{"name":"Andrzej Kaczmarczyk","slug":"andrzej-kaczmarczyk","given":"Andrzej","family":"Kaczmarczyk","affiliation":"Technische Universität Berlin , Chair of Algorithmics and Computational Complexity , Berlin , Germany"},{"name":"Martin Lackner","slug":"martin-lackner","given":"Martin","family":"Lackner","affiliation":"TU Wien , Institute of Logic and Computation , Vienna , Austria"}],"abstract":"In parliamentary elections, parties compete for a limited, typically fixed number of seats. We study the complexity of the following bribery-style problem: Given the distribution of votes among the parties, what is the smallest number of voters that need to be convinced to vote for our party, so that it gets a desired number of seats. We also run extensive experiments on real-world election data and measure the effectiveness of our method.","doi":"10.24963/ijcai.2020/15","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/15","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/0015.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/15.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/bibtex/15","volume":{"slug":"2020","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2020","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2020/","year":2020,"location":"Yokohama","dates":"January 2021 (postponed from 11-17 July 2020)","editors":"Christian Bessiere","isbn":"978-0-9992411-6-5","publisher":"International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization","doi_prefix":"10.24963/ijcai.2020"},"section":"Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems","track":"Main track","number":15,"pages":{"first":103,"last":109},"keywords":["Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Algorithmic Game Theory","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Computational Social Choice","Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: Voting"],"videos":[{"label":"Video","url":"https://videos.ijcai20.org/24988/file_24988.m3u8","length_sec":274,"provider":"hls"}],"references":[{"position":1,"raw":"[Balinski and Young, 1975] M. 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