Strategic Candidacy Games with Lazy Candidates
Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Main Track. Pages 610-615.
Abstract
In strategic candidacy games, both voters and candidates have preferences over the set of candidates, and candidates may strategically withdraw from the election in order to manipulate the outcome according to their preferences. In this work, we extend the standard model of strategic candidacy games by observing that candidates may find it costly to run an electoral campaign and may therefore prefer to withdraw if their presence has no effect on the election outcome. We study the Nash equilibria and outcomes of natural best-response dynamics in the resulting class of games, both from a normative and from a computational perspective, and compare them with the Nash equilibria of the standard model.
@inproceedings{ijcai2015p92,
title = {Strategic Candidacy Games with Lazy Candidates},
author = {Obraztsova, Svetlana and Elkind, Edith and Polukarov, Maria and Rabinovich, Zinovi},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-15}},
publisher = {International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence},
editor = {Qiang Yang and Michael Wooldridge},
pages = {610--615},
year = {2015},
month = {7},
note = {Main Track},
url = {https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/92},
}
TY - CPAPER TI - Strategic Candidacy Games with Lazy Candidates AU - Obraztsova, Svetlana AU - Elkind, Edith AU - Polukarov, Maria AU - Rabinovich, Zinovi T2 - Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-15 PB - International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence PY - 2015 SP - 610 EP - 615 UR - https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/92 ER -Copied
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