Spiteful Bidding in the Dollar Auction
Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Main Track. Pages 667-672.
Abstract
Shubik's (all-pay) dollar auction is a simple yet powerful auction model that aims to shed light on the motives and dynamics of conflict escalation. Common intuition and experimental results suggest that the dollar auction is a trap, inducing conflict by its very design. However, O'Neill proved the surprising fact that, contrary to the experimental results and the intuition, the dollar auction has an immediate solution in pure strategies, i.e., theoretically it should not lead to conflict escalation. In this paper, inspired by the recent literature on spiteful bidders, we ask whether the escalation in the dollar auction can be induced by meanness. Our results confirm this conjecture in various scenarios.
@inproceedings{ijcai2015p100,
title = {Spiteful Bidding in the Dollar Auction},
author = {Waniek, Marcin and Niescieruk, Agata and Michalak, Tomasz P. and Rahwan, Talal},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-15}},
publisher = {International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence},
editor = {Qiang Yang and Michael Wooldridge},
pages = {667--672},
year = {2015},
month = {7},
note = {Main Track},
url = {https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/100},
}
TY - CPAPER TI - Spiteful Bidding in the Dollar Auction AU - Waniek, Marcin AU - Niescieruk, Agata AU - Michalak, Tomasz P. AU - Rahwan, Talal T2 - Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-15 PB - International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence PY - 2015 SP - 667 EP - 672 UR - https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2015/100 ER -Copied
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