Agent Failures in All-Pay Auctions

Lewenberg, Yoad; Lev, Omer; Bachrach, Yoram; Rosenschein, Jeffrey S.

Agent Failures in All-Pay Auctions

Yoad Lewenberg, Omer Lev, Yoram Bachrach, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

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Proceedings of the Twenty-Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Pages 241-246.

Abstract

All-pay auctions, a common mechanism for various human and agent interactions, suffers, like many other mechanisms, from the possibility of players' failure to participate in the auction. We model such failures and show how they affect the equilibrium state, revealing various properties, such as the lack of influence of the most-likely-to-participate player on the behavior of the other players. We perform this analysis with two scenarios: the sum-profit model, where the auctioneer obtains the sum of all submitted bids, and the max-profit model of crowdsourcing contests, where the auctioneer can only use the best submissions and thus obtains only the winning bid. Furthermore, we examine various methods of influencing the probability of participation such as the effects of misreporting one's own probability of participating, and how influencing another player's participation chances (e.g., sabotage) changes the player's strategy.

Yoad Lewenberg, Omer Lev, Yoram Bachrach, and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein. 2013. Agent Failures in All-Pay Auctions. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-13. IJCAI, 241–246. https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2013/45

@inproceedings{ijcai2013p45,
  title     = {Agent Failures in All-Pay Auctions},
  author    = {Lewenberg, Yoad and Lev, Omer and Bachrach, Yoram and Rosenschein, Jeffrey S.},
  booktitle = {Proceedings of the Twenty-Third International Joint Conference on
               Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-13}},
  publisher = {AAAI Press / International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence},
  editor    = {Francesca Rossi},
  pages     = {241--246},
  year      = {2013},
  month     = {8},
  url       = {https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2013/45},
}

TY  - CPAPER
TI  - Agent Failures in All-Pay Auctions
AU  - Lewenberg, Yoad
AU  - Lev, Omer
AU  - Bachrach, Yoram
AU  - Rosenschein, Jeffrey S.
T2  - Proceedings of the Twenty-Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-13
PB  - AAAI Press / International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence
PY  - 2013
SP  - 241
EP  - 246
UR  - https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2013/45
ER  -