Maximal Recursive Rule: A New Social Decision Scheme
Proceedings of the Twenty-Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Pages 34-39.
Abstract
In social choice settings with strict preferences, random dictatorship rules were characterized by Gibbard [1977] as the only randomized social choice functions that satisfy strategyproofness and ex post efficiency. In the more general domain with indifferences, RSD (random serial dictatorship) rules are the well-known and perhaps only known generalization of random dictatorship. We present a new generalization of random dictatorship for indifferences called Maximal Recursive (MR) rule as an alternative to RSD. We show that MR is polynomial-time computable, weakly strategyproof with respect to stochastic dominance, and, in some respects, outperforms RSD on efficiency.
@inproceedings{ijcai2013p17,
title = {Maximal Recursive Rule: A New Social Decision Scheme},
author = {Aziz, Haris},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Twenty-Third International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-13}},
publisher = {AAAI Press / International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence},
editor = {Francesca Rossi},
pages = {34--39},
year = {2013},
month = {8},
url = {https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2013/17},
}
TY - CPAPER TI - Maximal Recursive Rule: A New Social Decision Scheme AU - Aziz, Haris T2 - Proceedings of the Twenty-Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-13 PB - AAAI Press / International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence PY - 2013 SP - 34 EP - 39 UR - https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2013/17 ER -Copied
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