Mechanism Design for Double Auctions with Temporal Constraints
Proceedings of the Twenty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Pages 472-476.
Abstract
This paper examines an extended double auction model where market clearing is restricted by temporal constraints. It is found that the allocation problem in this model can be effectively transformed into a weighted bipartite matching in graph theory. By using the augmentation technique, we propose a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism in this model and demonstrate the advantages of the payment compared with the classical VCG payment (the Clarke pivot payment). We also show that the algorithms for both allocation and payment calculation run in polynomial time. It is expected that the method and results provided in this paper can be applied to the design and analysis of dynamic double auctions and futures markets.
@inproceedings{ijcai2011p86,
title = {Mechanism Design for Double Auctions with Temporal Constraints},
author = {Zhao, Dengji and Zhang, Dongmo and Perrussel, Laurent},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Twenty-Second International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-11}},
publisher = {AAAI Press/International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence},
editor = {Toby Walsh},
pages = {472--476},
year = {2011},
month = {7},
doi = {10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-086},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-086},
}
TY - CPAPER TI - Mechanism Design for Double Auctions with Temporal Constraints AU - Zhao, Dengji AU - Zhang, Dongmo AU - Perrussel, Laurent T2 - Proceedings of the Twenty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-11 PB - AAAI Press/International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence PY - 2011 SP - 472 EP - 476 DO - 10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-086 UR - https://doi.org/10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-086 ER -Copied
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