Approximately Strategy-Proof Voting
Proceedings of the Twenty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Pages 67-71.
Abstract
The classic Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem establishes that only dictatorial voting rules are strategy-proof; under any other voting rule, players have an incentive to lie about their true preferences. We consider a new approach for circumventing this result: we consider randomized voting rules that only approximate a deterministic voting rule and only are approximately strategy-proof. We show that any deterministic voting rule can be approximated by an approximately strategy-proof randomized voting rule, and we provide asymptotically tight lower bounds on the parameters required by such voting rules.
@inproceedings{ijcai2011p23,
title = {Approximately Strategy-Proof Voting},
author = {Birrell, Eleanor and Pass, Rafael},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Twenty-Second International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-11}},
publisher = {AAAI Press/International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence},
editor = {Toby Walsh},
pages = {67--71},
year = {2011},
month = {7},
doi = {10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-023},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-023},
}
TY - CPAPER TI - Approximately Strategy-Proof Voting AU - Birrell, Eleanor AU - Pass, Rafael T2 - Proceedings of the Twenty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-11 PB - AAAI Press/International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence PY - 2011 SP - 67 EP - 71 DO - 10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-023 UR - https://doi.org/10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-023 ER -Copied
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