Proceedings

Approximately Strategy-Proof Voting

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Proceedings of the Twenty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Pages 67-71.

https://doi.org/10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-023

Abstract

The classic Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem establishes that only dictatorial voting rules are strategy-proof; under any other voting rule, players have an incentive to lie about their true preferences. We consider a new approach for circumventing this result: we consider randomized voting rules that only approximate a deterministic voting rule and only are approximately strategy-proof. We show that any deterministic voting rule can be approximated by an approximately strategy-proof randomized voting rule, and we provide asymptotically tight lower bounds on the parameters required by such voting rules.

Eleanor Birrell, and Rafael Pass. 2011. Approximately Strategy-Proof Voting. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-11. IJCAI, 67–71. https://doi.org/10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-023
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