{"type":"ScholarlyArticle","title":"Approximately Strategy-Proof Voting","authors":[{"name":"Eleanor Birrell","slug":"eleanor-birrell","given":"Eleanor","family":"Birrell","affiliation":""},{"name":"Rafael Pass","slug":"rafael-pass","given":"Rafael","family":"Pass","affiliation":""}],"abstract":"The classic Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem establishes that only dictatorial voting rules are strategy-proof; under any other voting rule, players have an incentive to lie about their true preferences. We consider a new approach for circumventing this result: we consider randomized voting rules that only approximate a deterministic voting rule and only are approximately strategy-proof. We show that any deterministic voting rule can be approximated by an approximately strategy-proof randomized voting rule, and we provide asymptotically tight lower bounds on the parameters required by such voting rules.","doi":"10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-023","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2011/23","pdf":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2011/0023.pdf","markdown":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2011/23.md","bibtex":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2011/bibtex/23","volume":{"slug":"2011","title":"Proceedings of the Twenty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence","short_title":"IJCAI 2011","url":"https://ijcai.org/proceedings/2011/","year":2011,"location":"Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain","dates":"16–22 July 2011","editors":"Toby Walsh","isbn":"978-1-57735-512-0; 978-1-57735-513-7; 978-1-57735-514-4; 978-1-57735-515-1; 978-1-57735-516-8","publisher":"AAAI Press/International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence","doi_prefix":""},"section":null,"track":"","number":23,"pages":{"first":67,"last":71},"keywords":[],"videos":[],"references":[],"license_note":"Copyright International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence."}