Unweighted Coalitional Manipulation under the Borda Rule Is NP-Hard
Proceedings of the Twenty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Pages 55-59.
Abstract
The Borda voting rule is a positional scoring rule where, for m candidates, for every vote the first candidate receives m-1 points, the second m-2 points and so on. A Borda winner is a candidate with highest total score. It has been a prominent open problem to determine the computational complexity of Unweighted Coalitional Manipulation under Borda: Can one add a certain number of additional votes (called manipulators) to an election such that a distinguished candidate becomes a winner? We settle this open problem by showing NP-hardness even for two manipulators and three input votes. Moreover, we discuss extensions and limitations of this hardness result.
@inproceedings{ijcai2011p21,
title = {Unweighted Coalitional Manipulation under the Borda Rule Is NP-Hard},
author = {Betzler, Nadja and Niedermeier, Rolf and Woeginger, Gerhard J.},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Twenty-Second International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, {IJCAI-11}},
publisher = {AAAI Press/International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence},
editor = {Toby Walsh},
pages = {55--59},
year = {2011},
month = {7},
doi = {10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-021},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-021},
}
TY - CPAPER TI - Unweighted Coalitional Manipulation under the Borda Rule Is NP-Hard AU - Betzler, Nadja AU - Niedermeier, Rolf AU - Woeginger, Gerhard J. T2 - Proceedings of the Twenty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-11 PB - AAAI Press/International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence PY - 2011 SP - 55 EP - 59 DO - 10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-021 UR - https://doi.org/10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-021 ER -Copied
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